Chiding the 'apostles' of brainstem death and upbraiding 'editorial hymns' in favour of brainoriented criteria for death, Dr Martyn Evans's support for a cardiac-centred conception of death and his defence of the Danish Council of Ethics (DCE) sound indeed as a 'voice from the wilderness' (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) . Dr Evans's choice of religious metaphors is, nevertheless, probably appropriate, as in the guise of a 'disciple' of Wittgenstein he appeals to non-rational 'beliefs', 'convictions' and 'attitudes beyond the reach of science'. It is difficult to reply to assertions which 'stand independent of rational explanation' and even more so because Evans's case rests largely upon revelatory insights into how Wittgenstein 'might have put it'. This dismissal ofrationality and argument must severely restrict any attempt to grapple with some of the urgent moral problems generated by contemporary medical science and technology.
One point raised by Evans 'Brain-related criteria for death are only crudely reductionist if it is insisted that the person is nothing more than his brain. Obviously there is more to a person than a brain. But to say that a person will not be unless endowed with a brain is not to say that a person is his brain. A person will not be without a head, but we do not say that a person is a head. There is nothing in brain-related criteria for diagnosing death that commits one to reductionism (6)'.
Exponents of brainstem death argue that irreversible loss of brainstem function is both a necessary and sufficient criterion of death, in that it involves irreversible loss of integration of the organism as a whole. Evans misleadingly interprets this as an argument concerning the respective significance oftwo organs (the heart and the brainstem) competing for essentialist priority. But this misses the point. The assessment of brainstem functions to determine irreversible loss of function of the organism as a whole is a far larger requirement, yielding greater accuracy than mere loss of heartbeat. One still frequently reads of patients recovering consciousness in morgues (having been consigned there by cardio-centrically inclined physicians) whereas no one to my knowledge has ever recovered consciousness while being 'ventilated to asystole' following a diagnosis of brainstem death. A brief reminder of the criteria for brainstem death should dispose ofthe two-organs myth. Unlike tests for the cessation of heartbeat, tests for the irreversible loss of brainstem functions are context-dependent; they require pre-conditions which stress that the patient be in apnoeic coma of known aetiology; that all reversible causes of brainstem dysfunction have been considered and rigorously eliminated, and that only when this has been done, should appropriate tests be conducted. The objective of these is a) to ascertain the absence of cardinal brainstem reflexes and b) rigorously to document the apnoea. These procedures involve a battery of clinical tests (each reinforcing the information derived from the others). The determination of death on neurological grounds does not depend on a single procedure or the assessment of an essential function. When properly understood 'brainstem death' does not refer to the death ofa single David Lamb 101 organ; it is the point at which an individual no longer functions as an integrated biological unit.
Evans's point about the 'moral importance' of 'warm, pink and perfused' individuals is equally misleading in the context ofhis criticisms of criteria for brainstem death. It fails to acknowledge that these individuals are incapable ofspontaneously maintaining this state or of ever reverting to a condition where they could maintain a spontaneous (ie non-respirator dependent) condition.
Evans's recourse to what Wittgenstein 'might' have said on the significance of spontaneous respiration is not damaging to formulations of brainstem death, which have long acknowledged historically recorded cultural and religious doctrines concerning the significance of the 'breath of life' (7, 8) . Views expressed over centuries in the world's foremost religions might not be entirely compatible with modern scientific theory (Evans may be correct here) but they nevertheless provide a more authoritative source of cultural attitudes towards death than the idiosyncratic outpourings of Wittgenstein who, so we are told, adopted many of his moral views from his bedmaker. 
